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Cognitive Errors, Individual
Differences, and Paternalism
Jeffrey J. Rachlinskit
Legal scholars commonly argue that the widespread presence of cognitive errors in judg-
ment justifies legal intervention to save people from predictable mistakes. Such arguments often
fail to account for individual variation in the commission of such errors even though individual
variation is probably common. If predictable groups of people avoid making the errors that others
commit, then law should account for such differences because those who avoid errors will not
benefit from paternalistic interventions and indeed may be harmed by them. The research on indi-
vidual variation suggests three parameters that might distinguish people who can avoid error:
cognitive ability, experience and training, and demographic variables. None of the three predicts
good cognitive performance in a reliable fashion, but all three might predict good performance in
certain limited circumstances. Thus, legal scholars interested in the application of psychology to law
would do well to consider the possibility that an identifiable group will avoid cognitive errors.
Indeed, the legal system treats one of these (experience) as important, and marketers actively en-
gage in efforts to determine the relative vulnerability of different groups to cognitive error.
INTRODUCTION
Restricting individual choice in a free society is as perilous as it is
essential. Because the aggregation of individual choices directs the pro-
duction of goods and services, meddling with these choices risks misdi-
recting the economy. But if collective foolishness governs individual
choice, then allowing an unchecked market to direct the economy can
also produce an undesirable allocation of resources. The public's
schizophrenic perception of government reflects this tension. People
expect that government will respect their desires and commonly resent
restrictions on choice, but people also expect that government will pro-
tect them from market forces that would otherwise exploit their weak-
nesses Evidence that people make poor decisions favors restricting in-
dividual choice.' But what of evidence that decisionmaking skills vary?
t Professor of Law, Cornell University Law School. I thank the participants in this Sympo-
sium for their helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1 See Colin Camerer, et al, Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the
Case for "Asymmetric Paternalism," 151 U Pa L Rev 1211, 1212 (2003) ("To the extent that the
errors identified by behavioral research lead people not to behave in their own best interests,
paternalism may prove useful."); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for
Paternalism, 97 Nw U L Rev 1165, 1165 (2003) ("Recognition of the fallibility of human judg-
ment and the research that identifies this fallibility commonly inspire calls for imposing con-
straints on individual choice."); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard Thaler, A Behav-
ioralApproach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan L Rev 1471,1541 (1998) ("[B]ounded rationality
pushes toward a sort of anti-antipaternalism.").
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Scholars applying the psychology of judgment and choice to the le-
gal system (that is, scholars in the field called Behavioral Law and Eco-
nomics, or "BLE") have largely assumed that consumers share identical
cognitive processes and vulnerabilities.2 Rarely do BLE scholars seri-
ously consider the implications of a mixture of wisdom and foolishness
for legal policy. In the jargon of psychology, legal scholarship adopts a
nomothetic approach -treating all people as having identical cognitive
abilities. In contrast, reality almost certainly supports an ideographic
approach- treating people as having varying cognitive abilities.' Given
the complexity of human cognition and the incredible variation in atti-
tudes, beliefs, intelligence, and experience among consumers, they al-
most certainly do not commit identical errors. Scholars have neverthe-
less proceeded under the unexamined assumption that consumers are
sufficiently similar that a nomothetic approach is appropriate.
To be sure, no BLE scholar has ever embraced the proposition
that all people in all settings commit cognitive error to exactly the
same extent.' Indeed, much of the BLE literature discussing the dif-
ferences between lay and expert assessments of risk depends on the
(sometimes misplaced) faith that experts will avoid the cognitive er-
rors that plague laypersons. Similarly, calls to replace juries with
judges in civil trials commonly arise from a belief that judges avoid
cognitive errors that juries commit.! Others have argued that organiza-
tional settings can balance and correct mistakes that different indi-
viduals might make,6 implicitly recognizing differential abilities. The
nomothetic commitment in BLE is limited to the assumption that
every member of an identifiable group of people relies on cognitive
processes that are sufficiently similar that differences within the group
do not undermine policies designed to protect the group from suffer-
ing undesirable consequences of faulty decisionmaking. With the no-
2 See Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics' Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded
for Behavioral Law and Economics' Equal Incompetence, 91 Georgetown L J 67, 69 (2002)
("[Blehavioral law and economics treats all legal actors in all situations as if they were equally
predisposed to commit errors of judgment and choice.").
3 For a review of the "nomothetic" and "ideographic" approaches within the social sci-
ences, see Peter T. Manicas, Social Science, History of Philosophy of, in Edward Craig, ed, 8
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy 847 (Routledge 1998).
4 See Robert A. Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T Man, and the Future of Behavioral Law and
Economics, 56 Vand L Rev 1663, 1722 (2003) (calling the concern that BLE embraces uniform
cognitive error "a giant straw man").
5 See, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, and David Schkade, Assessing
Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 Yale L J 2071, 2113 (1998)
(relying on the cognitive limitations of jurors to conclude that "judges should decide on the
appropriate level of punitive damages").
6 See, for example, Rachlinski, 97 Nw U L Rev at 1214-19 (cited in note 1); Chip Heath,
Richard P. Larrick, and Joshua Klayman, Cognitive Repairs: How Organizational Practices Can
Compensate for Individual Shortcomings, 20 Rsrch in Org Beh 1,3 (1998).
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table exceptions of a critique by Greg Mitchell and an article by Colin
Camerer and his coauthors endorsing a soft form of paternalism, BLE
wholly embraces that nomothetic assumption.
This Essay explores the value of an ideographic approach in be-
havioral law and economics. Part I explores, in three parts, the assump-
tion that individual variation in cognitive style does not exist: first trac-
ing the origin of the assumption; second identifying how the assumption
can be tested; third reviewing empirical evidence on the veracity of the
assumption. In so doing, this Part considers three possible sources of
individual variation: cognitive ability, training and experience, and
demographic factors. None provides particularly good candidates for
supporting many implications for law of an ideographic approach. Nev-
ertheless, Part II discusses implications of an ideographic approach to
cognitive error.
I. THE SIMPLIFYING NOMOTHETIC ASSUMPTION
A. The Nomothetic Roots of Behavioral Law and Economics
Why would proponents of a psychological analysis of law so firmly
embrace the assumption that all people share similar cognitive abilities?
It is, after all, almost certainly a false assumption. It seems strange that
those who use psychology to deride rational choice theory for its adher-
ence to false simplifications would themselves pursue a similar course.
As Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein, and Richard Thaler put it, the point of
behavioral law and economics is to bring more accurate assumptions
concerning human behavior to law so as to produce, in their words, "law
and economics with a higher R-squared."' BLE's nomothetic assump-
tion thus seems quite at odds with the field's underlying goals.
The nomothetic foundation of behavioral law and economics
represents a methodological commitment that runs to the very roots
of the field. The phenomena that BLE scholars frequently discuss
(framing, adjustment, and anchoring; the representativeness heuristic;
cognitive availability; the hindsight bias; the endowment effect; norms
of reciprocity; hyperbolic discounting; and so forth) are usually dis-
cussed as if they affect everyone. But this assumption does not arise
from BLE itself. Rather, it arises from the fields that originally docu-
mented these phenomena: the cognitive psychology of judgment and
choice and behavioral economics. Both of these fields rely on a nomo-
7 Camerer, et al, 151 U Pa L Rev at 1212 (cited in note 1) (discussing "asymmetric pater-
nalism," which is paternalism that "creates large benefits for those who make errors, while im-
posing little or no harm on those who are fully rational"); Mitchell, 91 Georgetown L J at 72
(cited in note 2) (arguing that "the equal incompetence assumption is not faithful to the empiri-
cal data on judgment and choice").
8 Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, 50 Stan L Rev at 1487 (cited in note 1).
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thetic view of human cognition because they, in turn, arose from fields
that embrace a nomothetic view.
For its part, the psychology of judgment and choice mimics the
methodological approach of psychologists studying memory and per-
ception. Memory researchers are certainly aware that people's mne-
monic abilities vary, just as those who study perception know that vis-
ual and auditory acuity vary. Nevertheless, the basic cognitive mecha-
nisms underlying the mnemonic and perceptual systems are truly no-
mothetic. Even people with good memory, for example, find recognition
easier than recall and remember words at the beginning and end of
word lists better than those words in the middle. Similarly, everyone
sees the illusion of apparent motion that is the foundation of the mo-
tion picture industry. Given the success of researchers studying memory
and perception in identifying universal cognitive processes across peo-
ple of varying abilities, it only made sense for researchers to pursue a
similar nomothetic approach to the psychology of judgment and choice.
Behavioral economics embraced a nomothetic approach for slightly
different reasons. The earliest proponents of the field of behavioral eco-
nomics were well aware of the growing work in psychology and bor-
rowed from it (just as psychologists borrowed back from behavioral
economists). But the behavioral economic commitment to nomotheti-
cism arises from another source as well. Early work in behavioral eco-
nomics had as its goal undermining the assumption of full rationality
implicit in rational choice theory. Rational choice theory itself is a
nomothetic theory. It assumes everyone engages in the selfish pursuit
of his or her own interests at all times. Rational choice allows for vari-
ance in knowledge, preferences, and abilities, but the fundamental as-
sumption of rationality does not vary from person to person.
Given the nomothetic commitments of both cognitive psychology
and of behavioral economics, it is not surprising that behavioral law
and economics incorporates the assumption that people's cognitive
abilities do not vary. The nomothetic assumption is not part of BLE
because it is necessarily accurate, or even because it is sufficiently ac-
curate so as to constitute a useful simplification. Rather, the nomo-
thetic assumption has been carried along into legal analysis as an un-
examined stowaway.
B. Nomothetic versus Ideographic Methodology
To see how the nomothetic assumption functions, consider a typi-
cal experiment from the cognitive psychology of judgment and choice.
To demonstrate framing effects, Kahneman and Tversky presented two
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groups of subjects with a decision about which of two vaccines would
be appropriate for combating the onset of an oncoming Asian disease!
One vaccine carries some probability of saving all of the potential vic-
tims, while the other vaccine will save some fraction of the potential
victims for sure. Half of the subjects read a description of the problem
that poses the outcomes as saving lives (the "gain" frame), and the
other half of the subjects read a description of the problem that poses
the outcomes as losing lives (the "loss" frame). The problem can be
accurately described, or framed, either way, but the frame affects the
result. When the vaccines present potential gains, 72 percent of the
subjects favored the certain outcome of saving some lives, whereas
when the vaccines present potential losses, 78 percent of the subjects
favored the risky option.
This well-known, often criticized, and widely replicated study il-
lustrates well the nomothetic approach implicit in Kahneman and Tver-
sky's work." Kahneman and Tversky presented the results as a demon-
stration of the power of framing in choice, concluding that the results
reveal a reversal of preferences between the two decision frames. They
assert that the data represent a violation of rational-choice theory's as-
sumption that preferences are invariant. They further support this claim
by reference to numerous studies that replicate their result in different
contexts. As Kahneman and Tversky conclude, "The failure of invari-
ance is both pervasive and robust."" The conclusion is indisputable, in
one sense. An overwhelming majority of subjects prefer the safe op-
tion when the choices are described as a gain and the risky option
when the choices are described as a loss. Were this a democratic deci-
sion, society's choice would vary with the frame.
The data suggest, however, that a change in frame would not alter
the choice of nearly as many subjects in the Asian disease problem as
it might seem. Among the subjects in the gain frame, 28 percent chose
the riskier option. Presumably, these subjects would have chosen the
risky option in the loss frame as well, and it thus seems that 28 percent
of the subjects exposed to the Asian disease problem choose the risky
option, regardless of the frame. Similarly, the 22 percent of subjects in
the loss frame who chose the safe option presumably would have cho-
sen that option in the gain frame as well. Thus, it seems that 22 percent
of the subjects exposed to the Asian disease problem choose the safe
9 See Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 Am Psych
341,343 (1984).
10 See generally Irwin P. Levin, et al, A New Look at Framing Effects: Distribution of Effect
Sizes, Individual Differences, and Independence of Types of Effects, 88 Org Beh & Hum Dec
Processes 411 (2002) (reviewing the literature on framing).
11 Kahneman and Tversky,39 Am Psych at 343 (cited in note 9).
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option, regardless of the frame. In effect, half of the subjects (28 per-
cent in the loss frame and 22 percent in the gain frame) were unaf-
fected by frame.'2 A nomothetic researcher might respond that these
subjects were indeed influenced by frame, but their preferences were
sufficiently strong that the frame did not alter their choice. Figure 1
represents the nomothetic interpretation of the Asian disease problem.
FIGURE 1
Nomothetic interpretation of vaccine problem
Framing Effect
Gain Frame Loss Frame
Certain Risky
Preference
Figure 1 assumes that people's preferences for the two options
vary along a continuum, represented by the position on the abscissa.
Because the choice is binary, the middle of the graph reflects a cutoff
point; people with a preference that falls on the right side of the cutoff
prefer the risky option while those people with a preference that falls
on the left side of the cutoff prefer the certain option.
12 The subjects in the gain frame thus have one of three responses: the 28 percent who
choose the risky option; the 22 percent who choose the certain option and would have done so
regardless of frame (as evidenced by the data from the loss frame); and the 50 percent who
choose the certain option but would have chosen the risky option had they been exposed to the
loss frame. The subjects in the loss frame also have one of three responses: the 22 percent who
choose the certain option; the 28 percent who choose the risky option and would have done so
regardless of frame (as evidenced by the data from the gain frame); and the 50 percent who
choose the risky option but would have chosen the certain option had they been exposed to the
gain frame.
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The. bell curves in Figure 1 represent the distribution of prefer-
ences among all individuals that the two different decision frames pro-
duce. The gain frame produces a distribution of preferences that puts
most of the subjects on the left side of the midpoint. Following the
nomothetic interpretation of the data, altering the problem to the loss
frame uniformly shifts the distribution of preferences. The distribution
of preferences in the loss frame lies largely on the right side of the
midpoint. The "failure of invariance" to which Tversky and Kahneman
refer is thus reflected in a shift in preferences among everyone in the
population. Even though the framing effect influences all of the sub-
jects' preferences, it does not alter everyone's choice.
Figure 2 represents the ideographic interpretation of the Asian
disease problem.
FIGURE 2
Ideographic interpretation of vaccine problem
Framing Effect
Gain Frame Loss Frame
Certain Risky
Preference
Figure 2 assumes that the decision frame influences some people
heavily and some people not at all. The former group attends closely
to the frame; when the problem presents losses, they gamble, and when
the problem presents gains, they embrace certainty. They vary in terms
of the degree to which they like the choice they make, but the framing
effect completely determines their choice. The latter group of subjects,
by contrast, is completely indifferent to the frame. They have different
reactions to the choice, but these reactions do not depend on the frame.
The frame has no hold on them.
The University of Chicago Law Review
Summing the distributions of the preferences of the two types would
yield a graph that looks exactly like Figure 1. That is to say, it would pro-
duce two distributions of responses to the problem-one in the loss
frame and one in the gain frame. But Figure 2 suggests that the data mask
an important distinction. Half of the subjects resist the cognitive trap that
Tversky and Kahneman have laid, and half are so vulnerable to the trap
that their vulnerability completely dictates their choice.
The Asian disease study thus does not distinguish between the no-
mothetic and ideographic models of human cognition. The binary choice
that the problem demands is too clumsy. Measuring the strength of the
preferences, however, would not help. Such a measure would likely pro-
duce something like Figure 1. If the continuous measures dovetail with
the binary choice, they would simply confirm that the frames shift prefer-
ences. As noted above, a summation of the two types of populations of
subjects (those affected by frame and those unaffected by frame) would
also produce the distribution in Figure 1. Hence, results consistent with
Figure 1 do not indicate whether the subjects can be distinguished into
two subtypes.
A within-subjects design (exposing subjects to both frames and
simply asking the question twice) also provides no way of distinguish-
ing the two models. In within-subjects studies, 31 percent of the sub-
jects express inconsistent preferences." As discussed, the between-
subjects study suggests that 50 percent of the subjects would switch
preferences. The results do not, however, suggest that 69 percent (or
even 19 percent) of the subjects are immune from framing effects.
Rather, the within-subjects problem presents a different question than
the between-subjects problem. The within-subjects design provides
more clues to the arbitrary, and potentially misleading, aspects of the
decision frame. Some of the subjects identify these clues and respond
consistently. These people might well have been influenced by the de-
cision frame had they reviewed only one of the two problems.
Distinguishing between the two approaches requires identifying
some ideographic parameter that divides people into those who are
affected by frame and those who are not. For example, suppose that
those who are highly experienced with making public-health decisions
are unaffected by frame. Such experts might each choose different
vaccines, but they might be able to ignore the features of the problem
that produce the decision's frame. Dividing up the experts and layper-
sons might reveal that the frame had a decisive effect on lay judgment,
13 See Keith E. Stanovich and Richard F. West, Individual Differences in Framing and
Conjunction Effects, 4 Thinking & Reasoning 289, 295 (1998) (reporting that 69.2 percent of the
subjects in a within-subjects presentation of the Asian disease problem expressed consistent prefer-
ences in the two frames).
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but no effect on the judgment of the experts. If so, then the nomothetic
model would have to be rejected as failing to recognize an important
factor in the decisionmaking process. A policy proposal founded upon
data on framing gathered from laypersons but directed towards experts
might be misleading.
The binary nature of the Asian disease problem makes an ideo-
graphic parameter particularly difficult to identify, and can lead to
easy misinterpretation. For example, suppose that laypersons exhibit
the pattern of data that Kahneman and Tversky originally documented,
but that experts all embrace the certain outcome regardless of the
frame. Such results could mean that experts are simply trained to em-
brace the certain outcome, and hence the frame has no effect on them.
But such results could also indicate that experts are much more risk
averse than laypersons. The distribution of expert preferences might lie
so far to the left of the cutoff point that the problem did not provide
an adequate test of the impact of framing on experts.
Even if the experts split on their choices, a failure to show a fram-
ing effect does not necessarily mean that framing had no effect. Sup-
pose that instead of all selecting the certain option, half of the experts
choose the certain option and half choose the uncertain option. This
provides solid, but not conclusive, support for the ideographic model.
But suppose that experts make more extreme judgments than layper-
sons. The experts who choose the risky option might be more confi-
dent of it in the loss frame than the gain frame and the experts who
choose the safe option might be more confident of it in the gain frame
than the loss frame. Framing might still have the same effect on ex-
perts as laypersons, but still fail to overcome the extreme judgment of
the experts and shift preferences. Only the combination of a continuous
measure of preferences plus an ideographic parameter would adequately
distinguish the models.
This analysis is not unique to framing. Many of the cognitive proc-
esses that BLE scholars apply could be similarly assessed. Studies of the
hindsight bias, endowment effect, contrast effects, and anchoring all
depend upon showing the extensive influence of some factor that is, as
a matter of deductive logic, irrelevant to decisionmaking. The studies
typically present two conditions and a binary outcome and rarely dis-
tinguish between a nomothetic and an ideographic interpretation of
any identified difference. In these studies, rational choice theory
makes no prediction as to the appropriate decision, other than that
the answer people select should not vary by condition. Researchers
use slightly different methods to identify phenomena such as overcon-
fidence, representativeness, availability, hyperbolic discounting, and
reciprocity. In these studies, rational choice (or deductive logic) dic-
The University of Chicago Law Review
tates a particular answer. Deviations from that answer therefore dem-
onstrate the erroneous influence of the psychological process.
Distinguishing between the two models is somewhat easier in stud-
ies in which rational choice implies a correct answer. Although such
studies commonly demonstrate that a large percentage of people devi-
ate from the predictions of rational choice theory, some people do get
the correct answer in these studies. This fact presents the greatest em-
pirical challenge for the nomothetic model, particularly if the percent-
age of people who get the correct answer is large. Even in studies in
which many people deviate from the predictions of rational choice
theory, the identification of a variable that predicts who gets the right
answer and who does not provides simple, direct support for the ideo-
graphic model.
C. Individual Differences in Cognition
The nomothetic model is a sitting duck. People likely express
enormous variation in their abilities to make accurate judgments and
any variable that differentiates how people make judgments under-
mines the nomothetic model. But an identification of an ideographic
parameter provides better support for the ideographic approach if the
parameter arises from a coherent theory as to how it affects cognitive
processes. Absent some theory, a scattershot of variables that some-
times predict who commits errors or interacts with the conditions in a
psychological study are apt to be too spurious to be of value to legal
analysis. Given the present state of research, the most likely source of
sensible theoretical parameters that might affect cognitive processes are:
intelligence (or cognitive ability), experience and training, and demo-
graphic factors.
1. Variations in cognitive ability.
The most intuitive source of vulnerability to cognitive error is in-
telligence. Psychologists who study judgment and choice frequently
assert that cognitive limitations force people to rely on heuristics,
which in turn produce errors in judgment. If so, then people with
greater cognitive abilities have less need to rely on simple heuristics
and therefore might make fewer errors." Deviations from the princi-
ples of deductive logic and rational choice that require the interven-
tion of the legal system might therefore be useful only for those who
lack the cognitive capacity to make reasoned decisions.
14 See Keith E. Stanovich and Richard F West, Individual Differences in Reasoning: Impli-
cations for the Rationality Debate?, 23 Behav & Brain Sci 645, 648-49 (2000) (examining how
aptitude effects individual vulnerability to a variety of cognitive errors).
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Psychologists Keith Stanovich and Richard West have provided
most of the research relating cognitive ability to cognitive error."
Their work suggests that people with greater cognitive ability seem to
make fewer mistakes on many kinds of problems that produce straight-
forward departures from deductive logic. For example, people with
greater cognitive ability are less likely to commit the conjunction fal-
lacy (for example, concluding that a severe earthquake in the United
States is less likely than an earthquake in California) and are more
able to solve complex problems like the Wason card-selection task(which is thought to be related to the confirmation bias-the tendency
to seek out only confirmatory evidence in hypothesis testing, even
when the presence or absence of disconfirming evidence would be
more useful). Lower cognitive capacity thereby implicates a cognitive
error that marketers commonly try to trigger. Marketers, particularly
of pharmaceuticals, often present confirmatory evidence as to the
benefits of their product. For example, pain reliever advertisements
routinely feature testimonials by those who consumed an analgesic
and reported that their pain disappeared. Such evidence is only half of
the story, because it reveals nothing about the relative benefits of the
product to other analgesics or to taking nothing. People with greater
cognitive ability might be less vulnerable to such efforts.
The data on base rate neglect, however, reveals the relationship be-
tween cognitive capacity and cognitive errors to be ambiguous. Smarter
people are a little more likely to attend to statistical base rates as op-
posed to vivid, salient exemplars (for example, using Consumer Reports
as opposed to an anecdote by a friend), but only when the base rates
identify a causal connection between the information and the cate-
gory. Intelligence has no effect on performance on problems involving
noncausal, or diagnostic, base rates (such as the rare disease problem).
The logical structure of Bayesian problems does not depend on whether
the evidence is causal or merely diagnostic, and so it is unclear why intel-
ligence should matter in some circumstances but not others.
These results suggest that the influence of cognitive capacity on
ability to avoid error will be highly contextual and hard to explain.
Stanovich and West have offered a rough account of the mixed evi-
dence on base rates. They argue that when approaching decisionmak-
ing problems that involve base rates, people first try to identify the
logical structure, and if they cannot, they follow instincts, which might
be misleading. A decisionmaker with greater cognitive abilities is more
likely to identify cues embedded within the problem that reveal the
deductive structure. Diagnostic, noncausal base rates present an ex-
15 See id.
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tremely difficult problem with few internal cues as to the correct reso-
lution, and so greater cognitive capacity is of no help. Determining
which problems embed cues that would be useful to smarter people is
a messy empirical task. Even if smarter people sometimes avoid mis-
takes of deductive logic in some settings, policymakers might be un-
able to identify these settings.
Furthermore, greater cognitive capacity seems to produce greater
overconfidence in judgment. Theoretically, this makes some sense be-
cause of the way that the cognitive mechanism underlying overconfi-
dence operates. After making a judgment, people generally try to jus-
tify their judgment. Reasons that the judgment might be wrong seem
to fade after the choice has been made. It is thus a faulty decisionmak-
ing style that produces overconfidence. People with better memory, or
who can process information more quickly, will be better able to mar-
shal support for their beliefs. Even as greater cognitive capacity allows
people to identify clues to the logical structures of some problems, it
promotes too much faith in one's abilities. Having intelligence is not
the same as having the wisdom to recognize that one's greater abilities
have been put in the service of a defective decisionmaking style.
Other cognitive phenomena are likely unaffected by cognitive ca-
pacity. Although some evidence suggests that greater cognitive capacity
immunizes people against framing effects, the evidence is all from
within-subjects experimental designs.16 In the within-subjects design,
people with greater cognitive capacity are better able to identify the
similarities of the two versions. In between-subjects designs it is un-
clear how cognitive capacity would be helpful. In the examples that
illustrate framing effects, no correct decision can be identified; the
certain outcome is usually as defensible a choice as the uncertain out-
come. The effect arises from two aspects of risky decisions. First, just
as people are more sensitive to changes in physical properties of the
world (illumination, sound, smell), so too are people more sensitive to
changes in wealth or risk. Second, losses trigger different associations
than gains. Because cognitive limitations do not produce framing ef-
fects, cognitive abilities should not correlate with the expression of
framing effects."
16 Stanovich and West, 4 Thinking & Reasoning at 295-96 (cited in note 13) (noting that
the subjects who gave consistent responses in the Asian disease problem had higher SAT scores,
where the study was conducted with a within-subjects design).
17 But see Andrew F. Simon, N.S. Fagley, and Jennifer Hallern, Decision Framing: Moderat-
ing Effects of Individual Differences and Cognitive Processing, 17 J Behav Dec Making 77, 88
(2004) (demonstrating that those who have high measures of "need for cognition" and have high
mathematical abilities show no framing effects).
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Cognitive ability is thus no panacea for avoiding cognitive errors.
Smart people seem to have greater ability to identify cues to the under-
lying structure of some logical problems, but they remain vulnerable
to errors. The positive correlation between intelligence and overconfi-
dence also suggests that smart people are even more vulnerable to
cognitive errors outside the lab because they will be less aware of the
need to be cautious in trusting their own judgment. Cognitive capacity
also seems completely irrelevant to other cognitive phenomena. Given
the erratic nature of the limited protection from cognitive error that
cognitive capacity provides, it presents a poor basis for legal policy.
2. Variations in training or education.
People can be taught to make better decisions. Research on judg-
ment and choice has always included a large number of studies de-
voted to identifying "debiasing" techniques or ways of avoiding badjudgment. Self-serving biases can be eliminated by forcing individuals
to identify the weaknesses in their own arguments." Imagining that al-
ternative outcomes could have occurred and identifying explanations
for how these outcomes might have occurred can reduce the hindsight
bias and related phenomena." Highly invasive strategies such as draw-
ing out "fault trees" or identifying and assigning probabilities to causal
pathways can sharpen probability estimates.W Overconfidence can like-
wise be overcome by thinking about the problem in a frequentist (for
example, seven out of ten) rather than a subjective (for example, 70
percent) probability format.2'
Learning a debiasing strategy is, however, not sufficient to ensure
that people will make good judgments. Training people to use a debi-
asing technique is not enough unless people learn when to rely on these
techniques. Indeed, research on experienced decisionmakers provides
numerous instances in which experienced professionals exhibit a range of
vulnerability to cognitive errors. Studies of accountants, lawyers, judges,
real estate brokers, securities analysts, mental health professionals, and
18 See, for example, Linda Babcock, George Loewenstein, and Samuel Issacharoff, Creating
Convergence: Debiasing Biased Litigants, 22 L & Soc Inquiry 913, 913-20 (1997) (describing
debiasing procedures against self-serving biases).
19 See, for example, Paul Slovic and Baruch Fischhoff, On the Psychology of Experimental
Surprises, 3 J Exp Psych: Hum Perception & Performance 544, 548 (1977) (showing how the
hindsight bias can be removed or limited).
20 See, for example, Baruch Fischhoff, Paul Slovic, and Sarah Lichtenstein, Fault Trees:
Sensitivity of Estimated Failure Probabilities to Problem Representation, 4 J Exp Psych: Hum
Perception & Performance 330, 332 (1978) (describing experiments that demonstrate how fault
trees can help to assess probabilities).
21 See, for example, Gerd Gigerenzer, How to Make Cognitive Illusions Disappear: Beyond
"Heuristics and Biases," 2 Eur Rev Soc Psych 83,89 (1991).
The University of Chicago Law Review
futures traders have revealed them all to be vulnerable to committing
cognitive errors, even on questions well within the domain of their ex-
pertise.22 Thus, experience and training, by themselves, do not constitute
an ideographic parameter that insulates people from cognitive error.
But certain kinds of experience and training might produce people who
avoid cognitive errors in judgment. Meteorologists, for example, give
well-calibrated estimates for the likelihood of rain and snow.3 A re-
cent study of insurance claims adjusters also finds them to be able to
avoid framing effects."
Experience does not uniformly produce unbiased decisionmak-
ing. The cost of cognitive errors is often low, or hard to identify. Law-
yers who are influenced by framing effects in evaluating settlement
offers, for example, often will give their clients advice that will hurt the
clients, but might further the goals of the attorney. Specifically, if de-
fense attorneys, with clients who face losses, give risk-seeking advice
about settlement, then the client will spend more on billable hours
than if the advice is risk neutral. Although one might expect the mar-
ket to drive out errors among experienced participants (or drive out
participants who make errors), the marketplace for professional ser-
vices is apt to be quite inefficient at doing so. The feedback necessary
for individuals to identify mistakes is often lacking. Continuing with
the example of attorneys and settling civil litigation, they almost al-
ways settle cases, thereby only rarely getting a true indication of how a
judge or jury would have decided the case. Because attorneys rarely
get feedback, it is hard to see how market forces would drive errone-
ous judgment out of the profession.
Training is also an unreliable means of avoiding cognitive errors
in judgment. In most professions, people are trained in the jargon and
skill necessary to understand the profession, but are not necessarily
given training specifically in making the kind of decisions that members
of the profession have to make. Thus, even though some psychologists
have argued that certain types of reasoning can be taught quickly and
easily,25 such training is extremely rare. Generalized training that al-
lows people to avoid a wide range of cognitive errors also seems un-
available. One study of the effects of graduate-level training in various
22 See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, and Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind,
86 Cornell L Rev 777,782-83 (2001) (summarizing this literature).
23 See Allan H. Murphy and Robert L. Winkler, Probability Forecasting in Meteorology, 79
J Am Stat Assn 489,494-95 (1984).
24 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski and Chris Guthrie, Heuristics and Biases Among Expert Negotiators
(on file with author).
25 See generally Peter Sedlmeier and Gerd Gigerenzer, Teaching Bayesian Reasoning in
Less Than Two Hours, 130 J Exp Psych 380 (2001).
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disciplines revealed that medical training and training in the hard sci-
ences conferred no immunity to common errors of statistical reason-
ing.6 Although training in social sciences (and ironically in law) im-
proves reasoning, the benefits appear to be quite limited. Even when
training and experience improve judgment, the improvement might be
exceptionally context specific. One study of insurance executives showed
that although they demonstrated some resistance to the conjunction
fallacy, the resistance depended upon direct experience with a precise
context.27 Thus, reinsurance executives resisted the conjunction fallacy
when estimating the likelihood that the United States would be hit by
a damaging hurricane (an event with which they had tremendous ex-
perience), but fell prey to the error when estimating the likelihood
that the United States would be hit by a devastating terrorist attack
(the study was conducted before 9/11). Insurance executives studied
more than a year after 9/11 displayed the opposite pattern, presumably
because they lacked experience with hurricanes, but had given enor-
mous thought to the experience of 9/11. Even though the structure of
the logical error is identical in all four parts of the study, the ability to
avoid the conjunction fallacy depended upon having had direct ex-
perience with the risk. The results do not show a general ability to
avoid the error.
The task-specific nature of the effects of training and experience
make it unlikely that these variables represent an ideographic parame-
ter that would easily mark those who are immune from cognitive error.
Successful debiasing procedures are incredibly invasive and often only
partly successful: good feedback is rare, overconfidence hides the aware-
ness that debiasing is necessary, biases are often costless and sometimes
even economically beneficial, and debiasing strategies seem highly con-
text specific.
3. Demographic factors.
Easily identifiable demographic parameters, such as race, sex, and
age might all correlate with cognitive error. Large differences in cog-
nitive vulnerabilities along race or gender lines would have significant
implications for legal analysis. Marketers would be able to target these
subgroups and policymakers would have to consider carefully how to
address these differences. Demographic differences in cognitive ability
26 Darin R. Lehman, Richard 0. Lempert, and Richard E. Nisbett. The Effects of Gradu-
ate Training on Reasoning: Formal Discipline and Thinking About Everyday-Life Events, 43 Am
Psych 431,440 (1988).
27 See generally Rachlinski and Guthrie, Heuristics and Biases Among Expert Negotiators
(cited in note 24).
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are also among the most highly studied and highly contested areas of
social science inquiry. But, as noted above, variations in cognitive abil-
ity do not readily translate into differential vulnerability to cognitive
errors. Studies of differential vulnerability to cognitive error by demo-
graphic factors are extremely rare.
The research on sex differences in judgment is typical of the state
of scholarship. Several studies suggest that women make more risk-
averse choices than men.2' Although these results suggest that men
and women view risk differently, they do not indicate a differential
susceptibility to cognitive error. In reference to Figures 1 and 2, gen-
der might give some indication as to where on the continuum an indi-
vidual falls, but does not help distinguish the two different models that
the figures represent.The research on cultural differences resembles the research on
sex differences. The research indicates that people from collectivist
cultures are more willing to undertake risky gambles." Researchers
believe this tendency results because people from collectivist cultures
have a strong norm of sharing benefits and risks, thereby allowing
them to behave in a fashion that more closely approximates risk neu-
trality. As with gender, however, even though people from different
cultures express different risk preferences, they do not necessarily
express any real differential vulnerability to cognitive error.
Research on collectivist versus individualist cultures has pro-
duced some limited evidence of differential vulnerability to cognitive
errors. Whereas people in Western, individualistic cultures excessively
attribute human behavior to stable personality traits-a phenomenon
known as the fundamental attribution error-people from more col-
lectivist societies largely avoid this error.' Self-esteem among people
from collectivist cultures is also more closely bound up with group,
rather than individual, achievement. Collectivism is no panacea for
good judgment, however. Curiously, people from collectivist cultures
exhibit greater overconfidence in judgment."
28 See Vickie L. Bajtelsmit, Alexandra Bernasek, and Nancy A. Jianakoplos, Gender Dif-
ferences in Defined Contribution Pension Decisions, 8 Fin Serv Rev 1, 1 (1999); Renate Schubert,
et al, Financial Decision-Making: Are Women Really More Risk-Averse?, 89 Am Econ Rev Pa-
pers & Proceedings 381,384-85 (1999).
29 Elke U. Weber and Christopher Hsee, Cross-Cultural Differences in Risk Perception, but
Cross-Cultural Similarities in Attitudes Towards Perceived Risk, 44 Mgmt Sci 1205,1208 (1998).
30 Michael W. Morris and Kaipaing Peng, Culture and Cause:American and Chinese Attribu-
tions for Social and Physical Events, 67 J Personality & Soc Psych 949, 961 (1994) (discussing a
study showing that American subjects tended to view social circumstances as products of personal
disposition, whereas Chinese subjects tended to see them as the result of situational factors).
31 See J. Frank Yates, Ju-Whei Lee, and Julie G. Bush, General Knowledge Overconfidence:
Cross-National Variations, Response Style, and "Reality," 70 Org Beh & Hum Dec Processes 87,
92 (1997) (reviewing evidence of greater overconfidence among Asians).
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Taken together, this research suggests that people from different
cultures have different risk preferences. Further research in the United
States echoes this conclusion. People in the United States who are
white and male tend to be less concerned about environmental risks
than people who are black and female.32 The groups are reversed on
other kinds of risks, such as those posed by abortions, thereby suggest-
ing that deeper cultural beliefs underlie these differences. These demo-
graphic variations do not correspond to differential vulnerability to
cognitive error, at least not without knowing which groups are over- or
underreacting to risk (or whether they truly face different risks). Still,
these results represent significant individual variation that might be of
importance to law and policy. People who believe they face more seri-
ous risks are apt to demand different programs from the government,
behave differently as jurors (or judges), and respond differently to
legal rules governing the allocation of risk. Furthermore, marketers
might be able to take advantage of differential risk preferences. Ad-
vertising and marketing strategies that concern risky behavior (includ-
ing financial decisions) commonly are directed carefully at specific
demographic segments.
Individual variations in vulnerability to cognitive errors in smaller
groups might also be common. Although researchers in judgment and
choice often do not study social behavior, imitation of trusted peers is
one of the most common responses to uncertain situations. People who
are uncertain about how to assess the complexities of such choices as
how to finance the purchase of an automobile (lease or buy), the
choice of a health-care plan (HMO or PPO), or whether to take social
security benefits early are apt to rely heavily on the choices made by
trusted others. One might describe this in terms of an imitation heuris-
tic. Such a heuristic might leave whole communities vulnerable to cer-
tain kinds of cognitive mistakes. Indeed, marketers target particular
communities for costly financing schemes such as rent-to-own or tax
rebate advances in large measure because some communities seem will-
ing to embrace such schemes. Choices about flood insurance likewise
are more sensitive to social contagion effects than to rational percep-
tion of actual risk (or even to informational campaigns or subsidies)."
32 See Dan Kahan, et al, Gender, Race and Risk Perceptions: The Influence of Cultural
Status Anxiety (Yale Law School Public Law Working Paper No 86, Apr 2005), online at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=723762 (visited Jan 2, 2006) (reviewing this literature).
33 See Jacob Gersen, Strategy and Cognition: Regulating Catastrophic Risk 156-57, unpub-
lished PhD dissertation, The University of Chicago (2001) ("[A]s informational conditions grow
increasingly favorable to the formation of cascades, the variability of risk management decisions
should and does in fact decrease.").
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4. Conclusion.
Supporters of the nomothetic model face real challenges from the
evidence of individual variation in vulnerability to cognitive error. It is
clear that individual variations exist. Nevertheless, for the purposes of
law and policy, the nomothetic model might well be sufficiently accu-
rate that it should be accepted as a reasonable approximation. The
circumstances in which intelligence, experience, and training improve
judgment seem too unpredictable to represent a solid foundation for
policymaking. Ironically, this is much the same argument that is often
made by devoted proponents of rational choice theory in response to
evidence of cognitive errors in judgment-that they are erratic, unde-
tectable, and sufficiently small that they can be neglected. Demo-
graphic factors, however, might represent a notable exception, even
though most of the data suggest that they correlate to different under-
lying preferences and not differential vulnerability to cognitive error.
II. IMPLICATIONS OF THE IDEOGRAPHIC MODEL FOR LAW
Given the difficulties of identifying a specific ideographic parame-
ter upon which the law can rely, it is a little easier to see why BLE has
retained its nomothetic roots. Nevertheless, BLE must be open to the
possibility that a useful ideographic parameter will emerge from messy
data that now exist. Cultural factors and gender, in fact, seem likely
candidates, given that these are easy-to-identify parameters on which
psychologists have found some variations in cognitive style. Further-
more, both the legal system and marketers sometimes embrace ideo-
graphic models of judgment and choice. BLE is ill-equipped to assess
either marketers or the legal system unless it develops some basic ideo-
graphic approach.
Replacing the nomothetic assumption with an ideographic model
of cognitive errors has two basic implications for law. First, it alters
several common arguments that cognitive psychology supports pater-
nalism somewhat. The presence of significant individual variation in
vulnerability suggests that the law needs to attend more closely to
individual variations in cognitive style, and perhaps craft legal rules
that sort individuals more carefully. Second, it casts new light on how
marketers behave and casts suspicion on marketing practices that are
designed to play on the cognitive errors of individuals.
A. The Costs of Paternalism
The most common use of cognitive psychology in legal scholar-
ship is to support paternalistic legal interventions. It stands to reason
that if individuals make predictable cognitive errors, then they can be
protected from the consequences of these errors. Such arguments
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have been made to support an expansion of strict liability in tort, more
aggressive use of the unconscionability doctrine in contract law, tighter
restrictions on the marketing of securities, mandatory health and safety
rules in the workplace, the imposition of nonwaivable (or difficult to
waive) contract terms, and greater restrictions on access to credit (among
others). Inevitably, paternalism comes at a price. It creates costly en-
forcement regimes and imposes choices on people who, even holding
the influence of cognitive error aside, would prefer an alternative to
what the law mandates.
Take the framing problem as an example. Suppose that the study
had presented an individual choice about a treatment, rather than a
collective one such as that of a public-health official concerning a vac-
cine. The treatment choices could have involved years of life added for
sure or a probability of more years or no years. Suppose also that un-
biased officials believed that most people would be better off with the
certain treatment, although some could sensibly prefer the risky treat-
ment. In effect, the "correct" distribution of choice might reflect the
distribution of the gain frame in Figure 1. But further suppose that
people often see the choice from the perspective of losses. Most choose
the risky treatment, even though an unbiased observer would conclude
that most should prefer the safe treatment. Framing can be blamed for
the mistaken choice, rather than a true reflection of unbiased prefer-
ences. Hence, public-health officials might consider refusing to allow
anyone to choose the risky treatment. Because most unbiased patients
would choose the safe treatment, this mandate might improve social
welfare. Under the mandate only one-quarter of patients get the
"wrong" treatment, while under the loss frame, fully half of the pa-
tients choose the wrong treatment.
The ideographic model does not change this analysis-at least
not without more detail. If Figure 2 accurately depicts how the choice
is being made, then the mandate still has the same effect. Absent the
mandate, half of the patients are immune from framing and they choose
treatments appropriate for them. The other half are affected heavily by
framing (more so than in the nomothetic model) and half of them
choose the wrong option, solely because of the frame. These people can
be saved from their unwise choice by the mandate, but only by impos-
ing the wrong choice on the quarter of patients who properly choose
the risky treatment and who are not affected by frame.
The ideographic approach raises the possibility that those who
are not being affected by frame can be identified and offered free
reign to select their own treatment options. If the ideographic parame-
ter that marks them can be easily observed, then there is little reason
to impose the wrong choice on those who are immune from the cogni-
tive error. Examples of sorting methods like this in law are rare. Secu-
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rities regulation includes a few examples in which "qualified" inves-
tors are offered choices that others are not. Tort law contains a few
examples involving experienced parties who assume risk. The law of
unconscionability in contract also gives weight to the experience of
the contracting party.
Even though the law thus seems to recognize that ideographic
parameters should be used to limit paternalistic inclinations, the law
relies on the wrong variables. The key ideographic parameter that law
relies upon is experience. Those who have experience with an activity
are said to assume the risks of the activity-those with experience in
an industry are thought to be less vulnerable to unconscionable con-
tractual terms. As noted above, however, experience is an unreliable
indicator of good judgment. The common law has seized upon an in-
tuitive, but unreliable, ideographic factor.
Arguably, an ideographic model supports weak paternalism in
which the law does not prohibit choice, but alters the context in which
people make decisions. In the framing example, the dominant solution
would perhaps entail inducing everyone to see the problem from a
gains perspective (assuming the risk aversion it induces to be sensi-
ble). Altering the default rule would be one way of accomplishing this.
Under the nomothetic model, such a change eliminates the unwanted
influence of framing that induces half of the patients to make the risky
choice when they should make the certain choice. Under the ideo-
graphic model, all of those affected by the frame switch to the safe
choice and those who are not affected are, well, not affected. This is
the analysis that leads Camerer and his colleagues to embrace this soft
form of paternalism." It makes no one worse off and some number
better off. To the extent that switching the default rule is costly, this
cost is needlessly imposed on those who are not vulnerable to the
cognitive error.
B. Targeted Marketing
The ideographic model casts a new light on the behavior of mar-
keters. Although efforts by marketers to segregate consumers can
have legitimate and socially useful ends, the ideographic model also
suggests that marketing might be designed to identify consumers who
are vulnerable to committing cognitive errors.
Legal scholars who rely on psychology have largely argued that
marketing has socially undesirable properties. Led largely by Jon Han-
son, many legal scholars contend that marketing represents an effort to
34 Camerer, et al, 151 U Pa L Rev at 1212 (cited in note 1).
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-dupe consumers into ignoring undesirable aspects of products." Accord-
ing to this work, marketing targets cognitive vulnerabilities. The theory
16has conceptual and pragmatic problems, but is appealing in its simplic-
ity. Marketers face a bewildering array of cognitive biases in consumers
that point in many directions, but marketers need not sort them out. All
they need to do is tinker with their advertising until they sell more
product. In Professor Hanson's view, this will occur when the marketing
hits upon a strategy that hides dangers that the product poses. Market-
ers thus need not understand the psychological research in order to
take advantage of cognitive vulnerabilities in consumers."
Hanson's model is basically nomothetic, but an ideographic ap-
proach provides another dimension supporting his argument. Market-
ers need not truly understand whether the cognitive vulnerabilities that
sell their products affect all or some of their potential customers, al-
though they should be sensitive to the variations in consumer cogni-
tion. Observable ideographic parameters that mark highly vulnerable
individuals can help marketers direct their campaigns. Just as they
need not understand the basic cognitive mechanisms that induce con-
sumers to misunderstand the risks of products, they need not under-
stand the theoretical underpinnings of why certain individuals are vul-
nerable to cognitive errors while others are not. All that marketers
need do is monitor the demographics of who is exposed to their ad-
vertisements and who buys their products.
Efforts to exploit the cognitive vulnerabilities of certain subgroups
of consumers differ in character from other efforts to segregate markets
through price discrimination. Price discrimination usually consists of an
effort to identify consumers who value a product more highly than
other consumers. Identifying cognitive vulnerabilities, however, con-
sists of an effort to find consumers who probably should not engage in
the transaction and induce them to do so by exploiting cognitive er-
rors that they are apt to make. As one example, a recent article by
Jonathan Klick argues that many industries use standard-form con-
35 Jon D. Hanson and Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of
Market Manipulation, 74 NYU L Rev 630, 637 (1999) ("[Manufacturers] will attempt to elicit
lower than accurate perceptions of risk rather than accurate ones."); Jon D. Hanson and Douglas
A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 Harv L
Rev 1420, 1425-27 (1999) ("[M]anufacturers have every incentive to utilize cognitive biases to
lower consumer appreciation of product risks.").
36 See James A. Henderson, Jr., and Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Product-Related Risk and Cognitive
Biases: The Shortcomings of Enterprise Liability, 6 Roger Williams U L Rev 213,229-44 (2000).
37 See Douglas A. Kysar, Kids & Cul-de-Sacs: Census 2000 and the Reproduction of Con-
sumer Culture, 87 Cornell L Rev 853, 875-87 (2002) (discussing how marketers try to segregate
consumers).
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tracts as a way of price discriminating. He contends that those con-
sumers most interested in the terms covered by the forms negotiate
these terms, while most consumers (who could not care less) do not.
However plausible this story,39 it is not clear whether the small minor-
ity of consumers are really those who value variations from the boi-
lerplate more than the rest or whether those consumers are just the
minority who are not affected by cognitive errors that plague the rest
of the population. Similarly, the variations in the financing of home
appliances in different communities might well reflect cognitive vul-
nerabilities, rather than fixed preferences or variations in creditwor-
thiness of people in the communities.
Standard-form contracts represent one of the three basic mecha-
nisms industries can use to segregate cognitively savvy consumers
from those who commit errors in judgment. Even in a market in which
most consumers suffer from cognitive errors, industry will still com-
pete for a small number of cognitively savvy consumers, thereby disci-
plining the whole market. But if this small group can be separated,
then they can exploit the cognitive weaknesses of the mass of con-
sumers. For example, industries can offer a standardized agreement
containing terms that most consumers would dislike and accept only
because of cognitive vulnerabilities. A small number of consumers who
do not suffer from errors might refuse to deal with the businesses that
offer such terms, or they might simply raise questions about the terms.
This act identifies them as cognitively savvy and the business simply
offers them more generous terms. Evidence that businesses will later
change their boilerplate might thus demonstrate an effort to segregate
those who make cognitive errors from those who do not.
The other basic mechanism to segregate consumers is to find low-
cost ways to make offers to large numbers of consumers -offers that
would be attractive only to those who make cognitive errors. This
mechanism is best illustrated by spammers. The marginal cost of spam
per offer is nearly zero, so spammers generally make offers that delib-
erately take advantage of people's weaknesses and fears. Get-rich-quick
schemes, genital enlargement, cheap pharmaceuticals and the like are
the bread and butter of spammers. If a spammer hits upon just the
right cognitive formula to entice a small percentage of the population,
their efforts will pay dividends. Widespread, low-cost advertisements
can ferret out and exploit those who fall prey to cognitive errors.
38 Jonathan Klick, The Microfoundations of Standard Form Contracts: Price Discrimination
vs. Behavioral Bias, 32 Fla St U L Rev 555,558 (2005).
39 But see Russell Korobkin, Possibility and Plausibility in Law and Economics, 32 Fla St
U L Rev 781,785 (2005) (suggesting that it is implausible).
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Finally, marketers might simply be able to identify groups that are
vulnerable to their messages and target these groups. Discovering that
rent-to-own plans or same-day tax rebates are popular among specific
demographic groups allows marketers to spend their advertising ef-
forts directly on those who might be vulnerable to the message.
To be sure, all three mechanisms have benign explanations. Pro-
viding better contract terms to the small number of people who ask
questions might be efficient price discrimination; widespread market-
ing campaigns are appropriate for products of broad appeal; and seg-
regated marketing targets advertising dollars on those who may have
sensible reasons for being more interested in the product offered than
others. But all three campaigns can also be explained easily by efforts
to sell a product or service precisely to people who, if they were fully
rational, would not purchase it.
Price discrimination might well be a benign, or even socially useful
aspect of the economy. But the ideographic model suggests that it might
instead constitute evidence of efforts to exploit cognitive vulnerability.
The difficulty of distinguishing sensible price discrimination from cogni-
tive exploitation might make regulatory intervention to curtail seg-
mented marketing strategies challenging, or even unwise. An ideographic
perspective might, at least, cast suspicion on segmented marketing efforts.
CONCLUSION
Distinguishing between the nomothetic and ideographic models
of cognitive error is methodologically challenging. Evidence that iden-
tifies clear ideographic parameters that identify cognitive vulnerability
is sufficiently rare that it is not surprising that most legal scholars who
consume psychological research have embraced the nomothetic model.
Still, an ideographic model is apt to be superior in some circumstances.
Marketers will identify ideographic parameters, even if lawmakers do
not. Individual differences in cognitive error cannot be wholly ignored.

